Edit distance, also known as Levenshtein distance, is a very useful tool to measure the similarity between two strings. It has been widely used in many applications such as natural language processing and bioinformatics. In this paper, we introduce a new type of fuzzy public key encryption called Edit Distance-based Encryption (EDE). In EDE, the encryptor can specify an alphabet string and a threshold when encrypting a message, and a decryptor can obtain a decryption key generated from another alphabet string, and the decryption will be successful if and only if the edit distance between the two strings is within the pre-defined threshold. We provide a formal definition and security model for EDE, and propose an EDE scheme that can securely evaluate the edit distance between two strings embedded in the ciphertext and the secret key. We also show an interesting application of our EDE scheme named Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption which is very useful in a broadcasting network. Abstract. Edit distance, also known as Levenshtein distance, is a very useful tool to measure the similarity between two strings. It has been widely used in many applications such as natural language processing and bioinformatics. In this paper, we introduce a new type of fuzzy public key encryption called Edit Distance-based Encryption (EDE). In EDE, the encryptor can specify an alphabet string and a threshold when encrypting a message, and a decryptor can obtain a decryption key generated from another alphabet string, and the decryption will be successful if and only if the edit distance between the two strings is within the pre-defined threshold. We provide a formal definition and security model for EDE, and propose an EDE scheme that can securely evaluate the edit distance between two strings embedded in the ciphertext and the secret key. We also show an interesting application of our EDE scheme named Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption which is very useful in a broadcasting network.
Introduction
Measuring the similarity between two strings is an important task in many applications such as natural language processing, bio-informatics, and data mining. One of the common similarity metrics that has been widely used in the above applications is the Edit Distance (a.k.a. Levenshtein distance), which counts the minimum number of operations (namely, insertion, deletion, and substitution) required to transform one string into the other. In this paper, we investigate a challenging problem of building fuzzy public key encryption schemes based on edit distance.
Our work is motivated by an open problem raised by Sahai and Waters in [21] , where the notion of Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was proposed. The Fuzzy IBE scheme introduced in [21] can be regarded as the first Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) scheme with a threshold access policy. To be more precise, it allows to use a private key corresponding to an identity string I to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with another identity string I if and only if the "set overlap" between I and I (i.e., |I ∩ I |) is larger than a pre-defined threshold. One of the open problems raised in [21] is to construct fuzzy encryption schemes based on other similarity metrics.
We should note that edit distance is very different from the "set overlap" distance used in Fuzzy IBE. For example, consider the biometric identity application of Fuzzy IBE described in [21] , given two strings I = "ATCG" and I = "GACT", we have |I ∩ I | = 4 (i.e., the distance is 0). However, the edit distance between I and I is 3. It is easy to see that the order of the alphabets in those strings will affect the edit distance, but not the set overlap distance. This simple example shows that to a certain extent edit distance provides better accuracy than the set overlap distance in measuring the similarity of two strings. As another example, given an encryption string I = "admirer" and a threshold distance d = 1, for edit distance, we can allow a decryption key associated with I = "admirers" to decrypt the message; while for set overlap distance, we can have some totally unrelated anagrams of I, such as I = "married", whose corresponding secret key can also decrypt the message. Due to the difference between the two distances (or similarity metrics), we cannot easily extend the technique used in [21] to construct a fuzzy encryption scheme for edit distance. Also, in order to distinguish our fuzzy encryption scheme based on edit distance from the Fuzzy IBE proposed in [21] , we name our new encryption scheme Edit Distance-based Encryption (or EDE, for short).
This Work
In this paper, we introduce the notion of Edit Distance-based Encryption (EDE), formalize its security, and propose a practical scheme in the standard model.
Edit distance can be measured in polynomial time using different techniques, such as dynamic programming or recursion. However, in an EDE scheme, the two strings I and I are embedded in the ciphertext CT and the user secret key SK, respectively. Hence, the problem becomes how to measure the distance of I and I using CT and SK. We observe that the most important operation in the edit distance algorithms is the equality test between two alphabets I[x] and I [y]. Based on this observation, our proposed EDE scheme uses bilinear map [6] to solve this issue. We illustrate our idea using the following example.
Suppose we have two strings I = "ATTGA" and I = "AGTA". We first encode each alphabet as a group element. Then in the encryption process, we create a randomized vector I = (A s , T s , T s , G s , A s ) using the same random number s. Similarly, we create another randomized vector I = (A r , G r , T r , A r ) in the key generation process. Then we apply bilinear map to conduct equality test between I and I using the two vectors I and I which are included in the ciphertext and the secret key respectively. The crux of the idea is illustrated in Figure 1 . In order to deal with the threshold problem, we apply the technique of Viète's formulas [22] to solve the problem. In the encryption process, we create a vector d = (1, 2, . . . , d, 0, . . . , 0) for the threshold distance d and embed the vector d in the ciphertext. Also, based on the edit distance d between I and I , we create another vector d = (1, 2, . . . , d , * , . . . , * ) where * denotes the wildcard (i.e., don't care) symbol. Then based on d and d , we ensure that the decryption can be successful if and only if d ≤ d. Also, we overcome the issue of malleability by using the composite order group in constructing the EDE scheme. We prove that our proposed scheme is selectively secure under the L-composite Decisional Diffie-Hellman (L-cDDH) assumption.
We also show an interesting application of our EDE scheme named Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption (FBE), which is very useful in broadcasting networks. An FBE scheme allows the encryptor (i.e., message sender) to specify a set of receiver identities during the encryption process, and a user can decrypt the message if and only if the minimum edit distance between his/her identity and all the identities chosen by the encryptor is below a threshold that is also specified by the encryptor during the encryption process. 
Related Work
Since the seminal work of Sahai and Waters [21] , many Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) schemes with the threshold access structure have been proposed (e.g., [9, 5, 11, 8] ). In [9] , Goyal et al. extended the work of Sahai and Waters to construct more expressive Key-Policy (KP) ABE where the access structure is defined via a tree of threshold gates. Bethencourt et al. [5] proposed the first Ciphertext-Policy (CP) ABE using the same access structure. Under the motivation of reducing the ciphertext size, which is linear in the size of the encryption attribute set in most of the existing ABE schemes, Herranz et al. [11] proposed a constant-size ABE scheme for the threshold access structure, which is essentially the same as the set overlap distance metric used in Fuzzy IBE [21] . In [8] , Ge et al. proposed another constant-size ABE scheme with the same threshold access structure but under a relatively weaker assumption. As of independent interest, some interesting fuzzy encryption techniques have been proposed in the literature, such as [15, 17, 16] .
Another type of fuzzy identity-based encryption is the Wildcarded IBE (or WIBE for short) proposed by Abdalla et al. [3, 1, 2] . A WIBE allows wildcard symbols to appear in an identity string used in the encryption process, and the wildcard positions will be ignored when measuring the equality of two identity strings. Another notion that is similar to WIBE is the Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) [14, 12, 22, 18, 19] , which also allows wildcards to appear in either the encryption string or the key generation string. However, both WIBE and HVE are based on the fuzzy equality test between two strings, which is different from the problem we aim to solve in this paper.
There are also a few works on the privacy-preserving edit distance evaluation between two strings [4, 13, 20, 7, 23] . These works mainly focused on finding the edit distance of two (perhaps encrypted) strings in a privacy-preserving manner, and hence is completely different from this work.
Preliminaries

Edit Distance
Consider a finite alphabet set A whose elements are used to construct strings. Let Z I , Z D and Z S be finite sets of integers. Let the function I : A → Z I be the insertion cost function, i.e., I(a) is the cost of inserting the element a ∈ A into a given string. Similarly, define the deletion cost function as D : A → Z D so that D(a) is the cost of deleting the element a ∈ A from a given string. Finally, define the substitution cost function S : A × A → Z S so that for a, b ∈ A, S(a, b) is the cost of replacing the element a by the element b in a given string.
Given two strings of length m and n, denoted by X ∈ A m and Y ∈ A n respectively, consider the sequence of insertion, deletion and substitution operations needed to transform X into Y and the corresponding aggregate cost of the transformation. Definition 1. The edit distance between X and Y is defined as the minimum aggregate cost of transforming X into Y . The general definition of edit distance given above considers different weights for different operations. In this paper we will consider a simpler definition which is given below. Definition 2. For all a, b ∈ A, let I(a) = D(a) = 1, S(a, b) = 1 when a = b, and S(a, a) = 0. Then, the edit distance is defined as the minimum number of insertion, deletion and substitution operations required to convert X into Y .
Dynamic Programming for Edit Distance
n be two strings. We use M (i, j) to denote the edit distance between the two sub strings X 1 X 2 ...X i and Y 1 Y 2 ...Y j . The problem of finding the edit distance between X and Y can be solved in O(mn) time via dynamic programming [10] , which will be used in our scheme.
Then, the edit distance M (m, n) is defined by the following recurrence relation for 1
The Viète's Formulas
Consider two vectors :
. . , z L ) where − → v contains both alphabets and wildcard symbols (*) and − → z only contains alphabets.
Let J = {j 1 , . . . , j n } ⊂ {1, . . . , L} denote the wildcard positions in − → v . Then according to [22] ,
To hide the computation, we choose random group element H i and put v i , z i as the exponents of group elements:
Using the Viète's formulas we can construct the coefficient λ k in (2) by:
where n = |J|. For example, if we have
Bilinear Map on Composite Order Groups and Its Assumption
Let p, q be two large prime numbers and n = pq. Let G, G T be cyclic groups of order n. We say e : G × G → G T is bilinear map over composite order groups if e satisfies the following properties:
Let G p and G q be two subgroups of G of order p and q, respectively. Then
We use g p and g q to denote generators of G p and G q , respectively. It is easy to see that e(h p , h q ) = 1 for all elements h p ∈ G p and h q ∈ G q since e(h p , h q ) = e(g a p , g
The Decisional L−cBDHE assumption:
We say that the decisional L−cBDHE assumption holds if for any probabilistic polynomial-time
, where (k) denotes an negligible function of k.
Edit Distance Based Encryption
An Edit Distance Based Encryption (EDE) scheme consists of the following four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
• Setup(1 n , Σ): on input a security parameter 1 n , an alphabet Σ, the algorithm outputs a public key P K and a master secret key M SK.
• Encrypt(P K, − → v , M, d): on input a public key P K, a message M , a vector − → v ∈ Σ n and a distance d, the algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT .
• KeyGen(M SK, − → x ): on input a master secret key M SK, a vector − → x ∈ Σ m , the algorithm outputs a decryption key SK.
• Decrypt(CT, SK): on input a ciphertext CT and a secret key SK, the algorithm outputs either a message
Security Model. The security model for an EDE scheme is defined via the following game between an adversary A and a challenger B.
• Setup: The challenger B run Setup(1 n , Σ) to generate the P K and M SK. P K is then passed to A.
• Query Phase 1: The challenger answers all private key queries for a vector − → σ by returning :
• Challenge: A submits two equal-length messages M 0 and M 1 , a target vector − → v * ∈ Σ n and threshold τ such that EditDistance( − → v * , − → σ ) > τ for any vector − → σ that has been queried in Phase 1. The challenger then flips a coin β ← {0, 1} and computes the challenge ciphertext
, which is given to A.
• Query Phase 2: same as Query Phase 1 except that EditDistance( − → v * , − → σ ) > τ for any vector σ queried in this phase.
• Output: A outputs a bit β as her guess for β.
Define the advantage of
Selective Security. In the selective security model, the adversary A is required to submit the target vector − → v * ∈ Σ n and threshold τ before the game setup, and A is only allowed to make private key queries for any vector − → σ that satisfies EditDistance( − → v * , − → σ ) > τ throughout the game.
Edit Distance Based Encryption Scheme
In this section, we introduce our EDE scheme, which is based on the the Dynamic Programming [10] algorithm for calculating edit distance.
-Setup(1 n , Σ): The setup algorithm first chooses L = poly(n) as the maximum number of length of a word that would appear in the encryption and key generation. It then picks large primes p, q, generates bilinear groups G, G T of composite order n = pq, and selects generators g p ∈ G p , g q ∈ G q . After that, generate
and set the public key and secret key as:
On input the public key P K, a vector − → v = (v 1 , . . . , v n1 ) with n 1 ≤ L, it first generates for each alphabet v i a vector
. . , 0 L ). Then choose s ∈ R Z n , and Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 , Z 5 ∈ R G q , and compute
Set the ciphertext as:
).
. . , 1 L ) for each alphabet z i , and creates − → σ = (1, 2, ..., L) and expands − → z to − → z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z m , . . . , 1 L ). Then choose r 1 , r 2 ∈ R Z n , and compute
. Then set the user secret key as SK = (m,
-Decrypt ( 
• for the index set Ω z = {L\{pos [1] [0], . . . , pos [1] 
• for the threshold index set J = {j 1 , . . . , j τ } with
Then recover M as:
Correctness.
In Algorithms 1:
We then illustrate an example:
Input: "AAGTA", "AAAGG" Output: In message recovery
e(g, f ) sr1 .
5 Security Analysis for The Proposed EDE Scheme
Assume that the Decisional L−cBDHE assumption holds, then for any PPT adversary, our EDE scheme is selectively secure.
Let B denote the algorithm to solve the Decisional L−cBDHE problem. B is given a challenge instance Z, T of the problem, where
B simulates the game for A as follows:
• Init: A submits a target vector − → v * ∈ Σ n , and target threshold τ . Let
• Setup: In this phase, B generates:
The corresponding master secret key components are:
• Query Phase 1: A queries the user secret key for a string − → z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z m ) under the (1, 2, . . . , σ, 0, . . . , 0) and 1, 2, . . . , τ, 0, . . . , 0). Note that since σ > τ , there exists at least one position i such that d i = 0 and σ i = 0. Let φ ∈ ind( − → d ) be the smallest integer such that σ φ = d φ . B simulates the user key generation process as follows:
where X = ind(
and σ φ = d φ . Hence, we have:
Then we chooser, r 2 randomly in Z n , and set r 1 = −α φ ∆ φ + r 1 , r 2 = r 2 . Then K 4,0,0 can be represented as:
Then we simulate T 4,k,t with k, t = 0 as:
Next, it generates for each alphabet in − → z :
Other elements in the key can also be simulated:
• Challenge: A sends two message M 0 , M 1 to B. The challenger then flips a coin β ← {0, 1}.
First, B generates for each alphabet in − → v * :
G q and sets:
where h = g c p for some unknown c ∈ Z p . B returns the challenge ciphertext
, then:
the challenge ciphertext is a valid encryption of M b . On the other hand, when T is uniformly distributed in G T,p , the challenge ciphertext is independent of b.
• Query Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
• Guess: A output b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b then B outputs 1; otherwise outputs 0.
If b = 0, then the simulation is the same as in the real game. Hence, A will have the probability 
Extension -Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption (FBE)
We demonstrate an extension of the proposed EDE scheme to achieve Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption. To illustrate how the scheme works, let's consider the following example. Suppose we encrypt a message under a keyword vector W = {Labour Party, Defence Unit} and a threshold distance d = 2. Subsequently, people who have the attributes related to the keyword w = Labor Party or w = Defense Unit can decrypt the message since the minimum edit distance between w (w , respectively) and all the keywords in W is 1, which is less than the threshold d = 2.
Definition
A Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption (FBE) scheme consists of the following four probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms:
• Setup(1 n , Σ): on input a security parameter 1 n , an alphabet Σ, the algorithm outputs a public key P K and the corresponding master secret key M SK.
• Encrypt(P K, M, W = (w 1,l1 , w 2,l2 , . . . , w k,l k ) ∈ Σ n1 , d): on input a public key P K, a list of k keywords W = (w 1,l1 , w 2,l2 , . . . , w k,l k ) in which each keyword w i,li has l i characters, and a threshold distance d, the algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT .
• Key Gen(M SK, w ∈ Σ m ): on input the master secret key M SK and a keyword w of length m, the algorithm outputs a secret key SK w .
• Decrypt(CT, SK w ): on input a ciphertext CT with keywords W = (w 1,l1 , w 2,l2 , . . . , w k,l k ) and a secret key SK w with keyword w, the algorithm outputs
Security Model
The security model for a FBE scheme is defined via the following game between an adversary A and a challenger B.
• Setup: The challenger B runs Setup(1 n , Σ) to generate P K and M SK. P K is then passed to A.
• Query Phase 1: The challenger answers private key queries for any keyword w by returning sk w ← KeyGen(M SK, w).
• Challenge: A submits two equal-length messages M 0 and M 1 , a target set of keywords
, and a threshold τ such that M in{EditDistance(W i,li , w)} k i=1 > τ for all keywords w that have been queried in Phase 1. The challenger then flips a coin β ← {0, 1}, and computes the challenge ciphertext
, τ ) which is given to A. Selective Security. In the selective model, the adversary A is required to submit the target vector W * and threshold τ before the game setup.
FBE Scheme
Below we present a FBE scheme based on our EDE scheme.
On input the public key P K, a list of k keywords W = (w 1,l1 , w 2,l2 , . . . , w k ,l k ) in which each keyword w i,li has l i alphabets, it first generates for each alphabet w i,j in keyword w i,li a vector
and
-KeyGen(M SK,w = (w 1 , . . . ,w m ) ∈ Σ m ): given a keywordw of length m, it generates y i = (w i , 1, . . . , 1 L ) for each alphabetw i , and creates − → σ = (1, 2, ..., L) and expandsw tow = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z m , . . . , 1 L ). Then choose r 1 , r 2 ∈ R Z n , and compute
, for t = 1, . . . , L. Then set the secret key as SK = (m,
). 
Theorem 2. Assume that the Decisional L−cBDHE assumption holds, then for any PPT adversary, our FBE scheme is selectively secure.
The security proof follows that of Theorem 1 and is omitted here.
